Not completely unconstitutional, but in several points incompatible with the Charter, because it went beyond regional competences. According to the Constitutional Court, the Regional law of Tuscany which regulates the very delicate issue of the end of life, and in particular access to assisted suicide in the specific cases that the Court itself has indicatedasking Parliament to legislate at a national level to cover a regulatory void within which, in the absence of regulation at a national level, arbitrariness can find roomis not unconstitutional as a whole. Because, we read in the press release issued by the Court itself, followed by reasons, it is believed that: «as a whole, the regional law can be traced back to the exercise of concurrent legislative power (between the State and the Regions ed.) in matters of health protection and pursues the aim of “dictating rules of a purely organizational and procedural nature, in order to uniformly regulate assistance by the regional health service to people who – finding themselves in the conditions established by this Court in sentence no. 242 of 2019, as further specified in sentence no. 135 of 2024 – ask to be helped to die””.
MANY RELIEFS IN INDIVIDUAL ARTICLES
But at the same time, the Court censures several points of the Tuscan law, those declared unconstitutional, for having trespassed on the field of state competence. AND the case of article 2, «which directly identifies the requirements for access to medically assisted suicide by making express reference to sentences no. 242 of 2019 and no. 135 of 2024″.
According to the Court, an invasion of the legislative competence exclusively under state jurisdiction in matters of civil and criminal lawas the regions are “precluded from crystallizing in their own provisions legal principles affirmed by this Court in a specific historical moment – in the abstract, moreover, they are also susceptible to modification – and moreover in the declared expectation of an intervention by the state legislator”. Instead, the Council reiterates, the regional law «cannot claim to act as a supplement to state legislation, so to speak “taking possession” of the regulatory principles identified by this Court». The same goes for article 4, declared unconstitutional in a specific pointlimited to the words: «, or his delegate», because, by allowing the submission of the request also to a delegate, «it clearly derogates from the regulatory framework established by law number 219 of 2017, in which the medicalized procedure of assistance to suicide has been framed by the jurisprudence of this Court».
INVASIONS IN THE FIELD OF THE STATE
Articles 5 and 6 were also declared unconstitutional, in all the parts in which they provide stringent deadlines for the verification of the requirements for access to medically assisted suicide and the definition of the related methods of implementation, again due to intrusiveness in the field of the State. «Without prejudice to the need for prompt consideration of the applicant’s request», we read in the press release, «the Court considered that this regulation invades the state legislative competence in matters of civil law, as it involves choices that require uniformity of treatment on the national territory».
AND STRICTIVE TERMS CONTRARY TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
Not only that, under the censure of the Council the “rigidity” of the regional law also ends up, which would end up colliding with the fundamental principle of the therapeutic alliance, and with the prospect of significantly reducing the demand for assisted suicide: «the setting of stringent deadlines» we read in the Court’s press release, «contrasts with the fundamental principles deducible from law number 219 of 2017, which instead “enhances and promotes the so-called therapeutic alliance”, for which the possibility of carrying out all those clinical and diagnostic investigations that the Commission, multidisciplinary and involving different skills (including psychiatric, palliative, psychological, medico-legal, etc.), deems appropriate must always be allowed”, also “through the concrete provision of effective palliative care”, “with a view to preventing and significantly reducing the demand for assisted suicide”. Also unconstitutional is Article 7, paragraph 1, which, by regulating support for medically assisted suicide, commits local health unit companies to ensuring technical and pharmacological support as well as healthcare assistance for preparation for self-administration of the authorized drug: «In confirming what was established by sentence no. 132 of 2025, the Court held that the regional provision violates the concurrent competence in matters of health protection, as “it does not arise as a detailed implementation of pre-existing fundamental principles found in state legislation, but as an illegitimate “determination” of the same by regional legislation””.
Some points of paragraphs 2 and 3 are also unconstitutional: the first because, speaking of “essential levels of assistance”, it interferes with definitions reserved for the state legislator. The second where he talks about “provision of treatment”. In the case of medically assisted suicide, in fact, sthe Court bends: «there is strictly no “provision” of a treatment that can be suspended or canceled (as instead in the cases of active euthanasia, which in Italian law can be traced back to the case of murder of the consenting person – both illegal ed. -), but rather assistance from health workers to a person who will have to carry out the final action which directly causes his own death himself».
PARLIAMENT INERTIA DOES NOT PRECLUDE PROCEDURAL RULES
While the rest of the law was “saved” because «the Court considered that the introduction of a regulation of an organizational and procedural nature such as the one contested cannot be considered precluded by the fact that the State has not yet approved a law that organically regulates, throughout the national territory, access to the medicalized procedure of assistance to suicide. In fact, within the limits specified above, the fundamental principles of the matter can already be deduced from the legislation in force, read in light of the Court’s ruling”. Words that once again sound like a warning to Parliament’s inertia regarding a regulation at national level.
