18 WEST VIRGINIA c. BPJ Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. Here, BPJ argues that the State’s sex classification fails heightened scrutiny not only because it does not fit her subclass, but also because it operates as a categorical exclusion, much like the classifications in Caban, Virginia, and Trimble. Here, unlike in Nguyen, there are no procedures for her to follow to prove that she is similarly situated to cisgender girls and thus able to participate on the girls’ team. Because this Court’s equal protection analysis of sex classifications has generally considered whether the classification fits discrete subclasses and the extent to which subclasses are burdened, it matters if BPJ is right about the purported problems she identifies. At this stage, the Court therefore needs additional facts to assess whether BPJ is in fact correct, and whether, as a result, the State has “unnecessarily” refused her an exception. Santana, 582 US, at 63, n. 13. In addition, while a State generally cannot rely on “mere” “administrative convenience” to justify the use of a sex classification, Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 US 142, 152 (1980), the Court has recognized that “(i)t may be that there are levels of administrative (in) convenience,” ibid., that could perhaps support a showing that the State has not denied an exception “unnecessarily and overbroadly,” Morales-Santana, 582 US, at 63, n. 13. Whether any of these justifications hold true here depends on factual findings that have not been made and, because of the Court’s decision today, never will be. 7 In contesting whether these facts matter in the equal protection analysis, the parties at points discuss whether a challenge like BPJ’s should be characterized as “as applied”” or “facial.”” As BPJ argues, in most cases, such as here, this debate is largely one of “semantics.” Brief for Respondent in No. 24–43, p. 46. It is true that some equal protection challenges, if successful, may mean that a given classification is impermissible in all applications and therefore resembles what this Court has called a “facial” challenge. That may be so, for instance, when the legislature has not identified an important or legitimate governmental interest. See, eg, Romer v. Evans, 517 US 620 (1996). In other challenges, though, the equal protection problem is not with the classification as such, but rather with its overbreadth or the way the classification’s lines have been drawn. As a result, the classification may constitutionally be applied to some individuals, see, eg, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 US
