The latest act was the suspension, decided by the Patriarch of Moscow Kirill, of two priests, Dmitry Safronov, on charges of having celebrated a function in memory of Alexei Navalny 40 days after the death of the Russian dissident, and Alexander Vostrodymov, guilty of having shared some Christian reflections on peace on their social profiles. From these “indictments” it is clear not only what the Russian government’s taboos are, but also how marked the contiguity of the Orthodox Church is with Vladimir Putin’s regime. We talked about it with Don Stefano Caprio, a professor of history, philosophy, theology and Russian culture who lived in Moscow for some time.
Don Stefano, let’s start with current events: can the suspension of the two priests lead to an arrest?
«In the case of Dmitry Savfronov, who celebrated a Mass in memory of Navalny, it is a purely ecclesiastical measure, the duration of which, moreover, is still imprecise, but could reach up to three years. At the moment, we are talking about a transfer to another parish where he will not be able to celebrate any function, but only be a cantor or lector. The meaning, if anything, lies in the fact that that prayer was addressed to Navalny. As for Vostrodymov, since an investigation has also been started, he could receive a fine, but I don’t think he will end up being arrested.”
Is there a possibility that both of them will be stripped of their priesthood?
«On an ecclesiastical level, yes. Patriarch Kirill himself has threatened the use of this measure for those who refuse to recite the prayer for Russian victory in the war in Ukraine. Vostrodymov limited himself to some reflections on peace, but in Safronov’s case, having refused to recite that prayer, moreover at a function in memory of Navalny, I believe makes him run this risk.”
How many cases of dissidence within the Russian Church have been recorded since the invasion of Ukraine?
«At the beginning of the conflict, there was a letter signed by 300 priests against the invasion. Several dozen of them were placed under observation.”
What does this imply?
«A proceeding is opened at the ecclesiastical tribunal of the individual diocese. In some cases one arrives directly at the Moscow Court of the Patriarchate, as in the case of Aleksei Uminsky, immediately reduced to the lay state and forced to flee to Lithuania, where a section of the Patriarchate of Constantinople was opened, which welcomes all Russian priests against the war.”
Were there other priests forced to flee?
«Some went abroad, others tried. Still others, however, are in the balance: they prefer not to expose themselves too much because they have a family…”.
And how much does the Russian government have an impact on this?
«In Russia there is a real twinning, a “symphony” as they call it, between the tsar and the patriarch. And despite the protests and disagreements, it has now become impossible to overthrow the system. Even at an ecclesiastical level. There is a strong manipulation of consciences whereby the Orthodox Church supports state propaganda to demonstrate that Russia is the target of the West and, for this reason, everyone must contribute to the cause to defend traditional values.”
Not even with Navalny’s death, which shook many consciences, was there a jolt in the Russian Church?
“Absolutely not. Furthermore, unlike Putin, who at a certain point found himself forced to justify what happened, without obviously taking responsibility for it, the Moscow patriarchate ignored the whole affair. He never said a word, not even after Navalny’s death.”
Do you mean that, from this point of view, the Orthodox Church is worse than Putin?
“Of course yes. We are talking about a structure that now monitors the ideological aspect and, therefore, also in order not to give signs of weakening, it cannot and must not say anything about it.”
Can we therefore say that the Orthodox Church is the sounding board for Putin’s propaganda?
“In a certain way, yes. With Putin’s coming to power, the Church inspired the Russian population through concepts such as defense, sovereignty and identity. Then, when Putin decided to take matters into his own hands aggressively, first with the invasion of Georgia and then of Ukraine, she limited herself to echoing his propaganda, adding justifications of a religious nature.”
And was it never possible to rebel against that violence?
«To tell the truth, Kirill initially did not support Putin. The most sensational moment was the annexation of Crimea in 2014: the patriarch did not participate in the celebrations. This opposition of his stemmed from the fact that he understood the risk, at that juncture, of antagonizing Ukraine, where the Orthodox Church is much more popular and rooted. Even at the beginning of the 2022 invasion he seemed not to want to expose himself too much, opting for silence. A week later, however, he intervened to reiterate the defense against the West.”
Regarding the conflict in Ukraine, how do you think the issue can be resolved?
«There are three possibilities. The first is that Russia manages to break through and win completely: I don’t think it will be able to conquer the whole of Ukraine, but it will certainly be able to reclaim the occupied territories because, at the moment, the war is in its favor. A second option is that, when cornered, you decide to start World War III using nuclear weapons, which, however, it seems to me the Russians themselves want to avoid. The third variant is that there will be no losers or winners, but a stalemate, a kind of cold war that could last decades as happened with Brezhnev at the end of the Second World War.”
For a change in the Russia of the future, do you think it will be the Orthodox Church from within or the Catholic Church from without that will play a decisive role?
«I fear that the Catholic Church will have a very small role, because it represents a minority in Russia. It does not have a great capacity for influence and, in order to survive, it is sometimes forced to submit a little to the Orthodox. The latter, although completely disqualified as it is, carries enormous weight. To change it would be necessary to return to the situation that existed at the end of the USSR, when it was looked down upon precisely because of the support it gave to Soviet policies. We must wait for a new religious rebirth, because, to date, there is no alternative in Russia.”